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Dunham v. Nevada, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 68 (Sep. 6, 2018)1
CRIMINAL APPEAL: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Summary
The Court determined that the word “resides” in NRS 205.067(5)(b)2 does not require that
the owner of a dwelling live permanently or continuously in the dwelling. The Court also held that
the sentence of a maximum of 96 months in prison with parole eligibility after 38 months imposed
on the appellant when a jury convicted him of home invasion, was not cruel and unusual
punishment.
Background
Appellant and Appellee lived in a rented a home in California. Appellee also owned a
condominium in her name only in Stateline, Nevada. After their separation in June 2016, Appellant
moved into the condominium, while Appellee maintained the California residence. In August
2016, Appellee obtained a protective order, ordering Appellant to stay at least 100 yards away
from her and from the condominium. Appellant did not abide by the protective order. On October
21, 2016, police arrested Appellant at Appellee’s condominium. Later that day, Appellee arrived
at the condominium to have the locks changed and have some repairs done in anticipation of
renting the condominium out as a vacation rental. Appellee left the condominium on October 23,
2016. On October 26, 2016, the contractor performing repairs found Appellant at the condominium
and found the kitchen window broken. Police arrested Appellant and he was charged with home
invasion and burglary. A jury convicted Appellant. Appellant was sentenced to 96 months in
prison, with parole eligibility after 38 months.
Discussion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury
Appellant argued that his proposed jury instruction should have been allowed, which stated
that “resides” as used in the home invasion statute in Nevada should be interpreted as requiring
the dwelling be permanently or continuously occupied. Appellant’s proposed jury instruction was
taken from Petrowsky v. Krause,3 a Wisonsin case. The Court held, however, that the Petrowsky
case was distinguishable from Appellant’s case because the court in the Petrowsky considered an
instruction based on a domestic violence statute, not a property-related statute. In Petrowsky, the
purpose in defining “reside” was to determine who was a “household member.” Appellant argued
that he was entitled to his jury instruction because under Crawford v. State, the defense is entitled
to instruct the jury on their theory of the case.4 The Court held, however, that although the defense
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is entitled to those instructions, they are not allowed to give “misleading, inaccurate, or
duplicitous” instructions.5
The plain language of NRS 205.067(1)6 indicates that a dwelling is inhabited when the
owner or other lawful occupant resides in it. However, the Court held that the word “resides” does
not require permanent or continuous presence in the dwelling. Since the dwelling in question was
a vacation home, Appellee could still be “residing” in the condominium, even if she only intended
to return and continue to use it as a “sleeping place”7 in the future. The purpose of using the word
“resides” in NRS 205.067(5)(b)8 is to determine which dwelling places should have more
protection than uninhabited ones.
While the Petrowsky case’s definition of “reside” in determining who a “household
member” is would require permanency and continuity, inhabiting a dwelling does not require that
same degree of permanency and continuity. The present case is more similar to Hess v. State,9 than
it is to Petrowsky. In Hess, the Court held that “[t]here is no requirement in the law that a house
be continuously occupied in order to be a ‘dwelling.’ It is sufficient that it is occasionally occupied
for residential purposes.”10 The present case is also similar to State v. Kautz,11 which said that
residence was still a dwelling, even though it had been empty for six months.12
Because the language and purpose of the NRS 205.067(5)(b)13 does not require the
permanence and continuity that the appellant wanted to indicate in his jury instruction, the Court
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Appellant’s jury instruction. To
allow the jury instruction would have been an inaccurate statement of law.
Appellant’s sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment
Appellant argues that because he only had one misdemeanor, had substance abuse
problems, had familial support, and he was a good father, his sentence of 96 months in prison with
parole eligibility after 38 months should be considered cruel and unusual punishment. The Court,
however, considers that NRS 205.067(2)14 provides that “a person convicted of home invasion can
be sentence to a minimum term of 1 year in prison and to a maximum term of 10 years.” Since
Appellant’s sentence falls within those parameters, it is not cruel and unusual punishment.
Conclusion
The Court held that the district court did not err when it refused the appellant’s jury
instruction because it would have been an inaccurate statement of law. Further, the sentence
imposed on Appellant is not cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence falls within the
parameters of NRS 205.067(2).15 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision.
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